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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. L. HACKETT & COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMPSON FL YIN'G 
SERVICE OF SAUT LAKE 
CITY, INC. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 961'3 
RESPONDEN'T'S BRIEF 
STATEME'N·T OF THE KIND O'F CASE 
This suit seeks damages from defendant for 
( 1) Conversion of an airplane, or ('2) Negligently 
damaging said ~airplane. 
DISPOSITION IN IJOWER COUR'T 
This case was tried :to a jury. A verdict and 
judgment were entered in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant on plaintiff's Second Cause of 
Action (negligence) for the sum of $4,997 .5'5. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant (appellant) ~asks for judgment in its 
favor as a matter of law and that failing a new 
trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent deems it necessary to include a 
statement of facts in cthiJs brief because the verdict 
of the jury is fully supported by those facts and this 
is not apparent from appellant's statement. 
'Gary Brimhall (the only witness who testified 
in this ,case) is the owner of a single engine Bellanea 
Cruise Master airplane (his cause of action for the 
destruction of this airplane was assigned to the 
plaintiff and respondent). Mr. Brimhall acquired 
the ownership of the aircraft in 19'58 ( R. 10) . At 
first Mr. Brimhall stored the aircraft at the air-
port on 211st South Street i'n Salt Lake City, Utah, 
but preferred to have the aircraft stored at the Salt 
Lake Municipal Airport No. 1, where defendant 
maintains its facilities (R. 17). Several months after 
he acquired the airp11ane, he became acquainted with 
Mr. Carl Hellberg!, who is the man~aging agent of 
defendant. These rtwo had a discussion concerning 
the storage of the aircraft in the facilities maintained 
by defendant and appellant at Salt Lake Municipal 
Airport No. 1. 
There was no express agreement between Mr. 
Brimhall and the defendant concerning the storage 
of the aircraft, and the only evidence of their agree-
ment ils a conversation between Mr. Brimhall and 
Mr. Hellberg, as testified to by 'Mr. Brimhall. 
1 Spelled Hallberg in the record. 
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Q. "Well, just tell me what you said and what 
he said." 
A. "The only thing I can remember at all 
would be that he said, 'Bring it over and we will 
take care of it.' '' 
Q. "He said 'Bring it over and we will take 
care of it?' That is the substance of what he told 
you, is that rig hit?" 
A. "Yes." (R. 18 & 19) 
The aircraft was at first stored for some weeks 
in a large hangar with other planes ( R. 19) . De-
fendant also owned and operated a series of hangars 
called "'T" hangars, which are so designated because 
of their distinctive shape and which can accommo-
date only one aircraft. Mr. Brimhall had expressed 
a desire for a "T" hangar, and some weeks after 
his arrangement was made with defendant, he w!as 
given a key to a NT" hangar and thereafter parked 
his aircraft in it (R. 20). 
Subsequently, his airplane was stored in a "T" 
hangar owned by a friend. He was, however, billed 
for this hangar through appellant and did not know 
what arrangements his friend had with Thompson's 
(R. 21). 
Still later, this hangar was sold and for some 
little time thereafter, the aircraft was 'again stored 
in the larger hangar with other aircraft ( R. 23) . 
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Thereafter, No. 1 "T" hangar became available 
and Mr. Brimhall stored his aircraft in this hangar. 
It was stored in this hangar until removed by de-
fendant without the owner's permission ( R. 16) 
to a larger hangar, where it was, on or about the 
lst day of February, t961, substantially destroyed 
by fire 1(R. 23 & 24). 
We, thus see, that during the approxim~ate two-
year period that Mr. Brimhall stored his aircraft 
with defendant, it was kept in a large hangar with 
other aircraft during two separate intervals, and at 
other times in three separate "T" hangars. The stor-
·age charge remained the same regardless where the 
aircraft was stored ( $30 per month ( R. 25) ) . While 
stored in the "T" Hangars, Mr. Brimhall was fur-
nished a key by defendant and the hangar door was 
customarily locked by Mr. Brimhall (R. 12). While 
the aircraft was stored in the large hangar with 
other aircraft, it would be parked on the ramp and 
stored and removed by defendant's employees (R. 
30). 
Appellant conceded that it had exclusive con-
trol of the airplane at the time of the fire ·(see pre-
trial order R. 5 & 6). Mr. Brimhall assumed that 
the aircraft had been removed from the "T" hangar 
to the larger hangar by appellant, because of his 
delinquent acc'ount (R. 30). Mr. Brimhall did not 
authorize defendant to remove the aircraft from 
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the "T" hangar to the large h~angar where it was 
burned. ( R. 16) 
Respondent framed its case in two causes of 
action. First, it alleged that the aircraft was, on or 
about January 1, 1961, converted by appellant. This 
was based on the removal of the aircraft from the 
"T" hangar without permission of the owner. In 
its second cause of action respondent alleged that 
on or about February 1, 1961, the aircraft was negli-
gently destroyed by appellant. This cause was based 
on the fact that the aircraft was at the time of the 
fire in appellant's large hangar and under its ex-
clusive control. 
·The airplane had an agreed value of $8,500 
before the fire, and a s·alvage value of $1,250, 'after-
ward. It was also agreed that defendant was en-
titled to an :offset of $2,252.'4'5 for sums owing by 
Gary Brimhall for storage and service up to the 
time of the fire. 
The court submitted two verdicts to the jury. 
One verdict was based on the theory of conversion, 
and the other on the theory of negligence. The dif-
ference was in the item for salvage value. If the 
aircraft was converted by defendant, plaintiff was 
entitled to recover the value of the aircraft less the 
setoff. Title would have passed. If the aircraft was 
negligently damaged, title would not pass ·and de-
fendant would be entitled to credit for the salvage 
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value. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plain-
tiff and against defendant for the sum of '$4,9917.55, 
based on plaintiff's theory of negligence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FACTS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER UNDER EITHER THE THEORY 
OF CONVERSION OR THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Respondent is entitled to recover from appellant 
under e:i:ther the theory of negligence or conversion 
and this concept is clear when the course of dealings 
between the parties is examined. Particularly their 
relationship when the aircraft was removed from 
the "'T" hangar 'to the large hangar, where it burned. 
For the sum of $30 per month, ~appellant agreed 
to store the aircraft. The aircraft was stored in a 
large hangar with other aircraft, and stored andre-
moved by defendant's employees. This gives rise 
to a simple bailment contract. These facts !are iden-
tical with those of Wyatt vs. Baughman, ·239 Pacific 
2d 194 (Utah), wherein it was held that where the 
defendant for a consideration agreed to store the air-
craft of the plaintiff's a simple contract of bailment 
arose. 
However, when the aircraft was stored in the 
"T" hangar, a different relationship is implied from 
the facts. The hangar accommodated only one air-
craft; the owner kept the hangar locked and stored 
and removed the aircraft himself. Here, the owner 
had control of the premises and this distinguishes 
the two relationships. While the aircraft was stored 
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in the "T" hangar; the relatinnship of landlord and 
tenant carne into being. 
3·2 Am. Jur. Landlord & Tenant Section 
2 '·''The relation of landlord and tenant is cre-
ated by contract, either express or implied, 
by the terms of which one person designated 
~'tenant" enters in possesssion of the land 
under another person known ~as landlord." 
The aircraft was converted if 'it was wrong-
fully removed from the "T" hangar by defendant 
(see the lower court's instruction, R. 64). When 
the defendant without the permission of the owner 
removed the aircraft from the ''T" hangar to the 
large hangar over which it had exc'lusive control, 
the owners cause of :a-ction for conversion was com-
plete. It was 'assumed by the owner, Mr. Brimhall, 
that the aircraft was moved from the "T" hangar 
because he was delinquent in his account for stor-
age with appellant (R. 2'7). Appellant offered no 
evidence to rebut this testimony. 
Appellant, by argument, seeks to justify seiz-
ing possession of the ~aircraft on the ground that it 
had a landlord lien on the aircraft for its unpaid 
storage and repair bill. Assuming that appellant 
had such a lien, nothing in our law gives him the 
right to seize possession of the tenant's property, 
except by following the statutory attachment proceed-
ing 38-3-3 U. C. A. 19·53 (see also 32 Am. Jur. 
Landlord & 'Tenant Section 58'3, where it is state·a 
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in effect that the statutory lien of the landlord musrt 
be enforced by Judicial proceedings and that the 
landlord has no right to seize the property of the 
tenant, and is liable for conversion if he does.) 
Thereafter until the fire, 'appellant had exclu-
sive control of the aircraft. A bailment relationship 
again came into being because appel'lant was still 
storing the aircraft, had control of it, and still claim-
ed its storage charges ·(see 'the answer of appellant 
at Record P. '4) . At this point in time, respondent 
validly claimed that 1the appellant was negligent 
and the issue was properly submitted 'to the jury. 
Appellant contends in substance that respon-
dent cannot rely at the same 1time on both the rela-
tionship of landlord and tenant and bailor or bailee 
and conversion and negligence, and that respondent 
was bound to elect on which theory it would pro-
ceed. Appellant's argument assumes that respondent 
relied on two theories at the same time. From what 
has been shown above, respondent did not rely on 
two theories at the same time. 'But r~ther, relied on 
successive causes of action based on different rela-
tionships existing ·at different periods of time. 
Both issues were properly submitted to the jury 
and the jury was correctly instructed. 
Appellant has attempted to support its argu-
ment by reference to the case of United Fire Insur-
ance Co. VIS. Paramount Fur Service, 156 N. E. 2d 
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121 (Ohio). We do not gain the same impression 
from reading this case as does the appellant. We 
quote from appellant's brief ·at P. 7: 
"Plaintiff proceeded against the original 
bailee upon the theory of conversion. How-
ever, recovery against the bailee was limited 
to the sum of $100, that being the ~agreed value 
of the cost according to the contract of bail-
ment. Plaintiff then sought to recover against 
the sub-bailee upon the theory of negligence. 
The court held that having elected to treat 
the original bailee as a converter, the owner 
·could not take the inconsistent position of 
suing the second bailee for loss resulting from 
negligence." 
~There is ~ we read the case, nothing in the 
decision to indicate that the owner had proceeded 
against the original bailee on the theory of conver-
sion, and on the sub-bailee on the theory of negli-
gence. This action was brought against the sub-
bailee only for negligence. From our reading of the 
case, it is nowhere stated by the court that the plain-
tiff had proceeded against the original bailee or for 
conversion. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE VER-
DICT. 
Appellant, under Point II of its argument, 
seems to contend ('1) That the relationship of land-
lord-tenant had not been terminated 'at the time of 
the fire, and ( 2) Assuming that the relationship 
had terminated, that at most, appellant was merely 
a gra;tuitous bailee, and liable only for gross negli-
gence. 
It must 'again be borne in mind that appellant 
had 'agreed to take care of the aircraft for $30 a 
month (R. 19). This was the original bailment con-
tract. Appellant offered no evidence at all, 'and did 
not in any manner show that the 'agreement of the 
parties had terminated prior to the fire. Indeed, 
defendant in its answer (R. 4) states: "That at the 
time of the fire mentioned in plaintiff's complaint, 
plaintiffs assignor was indebted to defendant for 
storage charges on his airplane, and for fuel, lubri-
cation, services, maintenance, and repairs in the 
amount of $2,252.45." (Italics supplied) This 
amount includes a charge for storage for the month 
in which the fire occurred. 
Appellant cl'aimed and was given full credit for 
this storage and repair bill. It is therefore clear, that 
when appellant shortly before the fire acquired pos-
sesssion of the aircraft, it did so with expectation of 
11 
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compensation for storing the aircraft. Under these 
facts, the con tract of bailment remained in exist-
ence. 
Appellant then argues that a bailment relation-
ship did not exist at the time of the fire because 
there was no evidence to show that the 30-day }'and-
lord's lien period had elapsed prior to the fire. We 
are given no authority to support the proposition 
and cannot see how the fact that appellant had a 
statutory lien would prevent it from being a bailee 
in this instance. But even further, when appellant 
seized possession of the aircraft, he h1ad achieved 
without legal process all that could be achieved with 
it, because our statute merely gave the landlord a 
possessory remedy before judgment, 38-3-1 to 8, 
UCA 19153. Appellant in a sense had perfected its 
lien and by so doing 'became a bailee of the aircraft. 
If we assume that the tenancy had not ter-
min'ated between the date the aircraft was seized 
and the date of the fire, this assumption cannot aid 
appellant because the duty of care incumbent upon 
a landlord that seizes the property of a tenant is 
the same as that of a 'bailee, and upon destruction 
or dam~age to the property, the same presumption of 
negligence arises. 
52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant, Section 69'5. 
" ... Where the property dis trained is injured 
while in custody of the landlord, the burden 
is on him to re.but the presumption of negli-
gence; but the Jury are to determine whether 
12 
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the landlord's negligence occasioned the in-jury." 
Appellant then argues that if the tenancy had 
terminated, it was then only a constructive or gr'ati-
tuitous bailee at the time of the fire and therefore, 
chargeable only with gross negligence. Appellant 
was, however, a compensated bailee, as reference 
to the facts and issues before the trial court will 
show. Again we repeat, tha:t appellant had agreed 
to store the aircraft for $30 per month and this 
basic agreement between the parties had never been 
terminated. Appellant charged for and claimed this 
amount up to and including the time of the fire. Ap-
pellant expected compensation for its services and it 
m'ay be inferred from the testimony of the owner 
of the aircraft, that it was moved to the larger 
hangar because appellant was not receiving the ex-
pected compensation. Appellant offered no evidence 
to the contrary. 
Appellant's claim that it was ·at most a gra-
tuitous bailee was never raised in the trial court. 
On the contrary, appellant requested the following 
instruction which was given verbatim by the trial 
court: 
Hin connection with plaintiff's second 
count, you are instructed tlrat the only duty 
upon the part of the defendant, with respect 
to the safekeeping of the Brimhall airplane 
stored in the defendant's hangar was to exer-
cise reasonable care for said airplane, that is 
to say, the same degree of care as would be 
13 
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exercised by a reasonably prudent person un-
der the same circumstances. 
The defendant was not an insurer of the 
safety of the Brimhall airplane. By this is 
meant that it is not liable merely because such 
person'al property was destroyed. It is liable 
only if it did some act or thing with reference 
to the care of such airplane as an ordinarily 
prudent person, similarly situated, would not 
have done; or if it failed to do some ·act or 
thing with reference to their care which an 
ordinarily prudent person, similarly situated, 
would have done. In other words, the defen-
dant was required to exercise such ordinary 
care and diligence with reference to the care 
of said airplane to prevent injury thereto 
while under its control, as a person of ordin-
ary prudence would have exercised in caring 
for property of the same kind, in the same 
situation, 'and under the same or similar cir-
cumstances or conditions. It is required to 
exercise such ordinary care with reference to 
the property as an ordinarily prudent person, 
engaged in the same business would have ex-
ercised under similar circumstances and con-
ditions.'' 
We thus see that in the trial court appellant 
urged th'at the duty incumbent upon it as regards 
the aircraft was that of ordinary care. For the first 
time on appeal, appellant claims that it is liable only 
for gross negligence. Appellant, however, is bound 
by its theory and instruction of ordinary negligence 
'adopted by the trial court. See Pettingiall vs. Per-
kins, 2'7'7 P. 2d 185 (Utah). 
14 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PAR-
TIES AND THE LAW ~PPLICABLE TO THE CASE. 
Appellant in Point III 'Of its argument attacks 
the lower court's instruction No. 6. This instruc-
tion reads: 
"If you find from the evidence in this case 
that the relationship between Brimhall and 
the Thompson Flying Service was that of 
bailment and, if you further find that 'Brim-
hall's airplane was damaged as a result of 
a fire while it was in the possession of the de-
fendant you may infer from that fact the de-
fendant was negligent and that his negligence 
was the proximate cause of the damage to the 
airplane. Such an inference does not amount 
to a preponderance of the evidence but you 
may use such inference as a basis for finding 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant was negligent." 
This instruction embodies the principle that in 
a case of bailment where the bailed property is dam-
aged while in possession of the bailee, a presump-
tion of law arises that the bailee was negligent. 
Where the bailee offers evidence of his freedom 
from negligence, the presumption disappears, but 
the inference of negligence remains to be determined 
by the jury together with all other evidence. Where, 
'as in the case at bar, the bailee offered no evidence 
of its freedom from negligence, the bailor is en-
titled to a directed verdict. 
15 
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Wyatt v. Baughman, 2'39 P. 2d 193 (Utah) 
Romney v. Covey Garage, 111 P. 2d 54'5 
fUtah) 
Thus, in the Wyatt case, supra, the court said: 
"From the foregoing analysis of the terms 
'presumption' and 'inference', it must be ap-
parent that what we referred to in the above 
quotation from the Sumsion case as a 'pre-
sumption', prior to introduction of evidence 
to contradict it, is truly a rebuttable 'pre-
sumption of law'. It is sufficient in the absence 
of evidence negativing negligence to warrant 
a directed verdict for the plaintiff, when the 
bailment and loss, damage or destruction of 
the bailed property is established. But the pre-
sumptive element of the assumption disap-
pears from the case upon presentation of some 
contravening evidence. The 'inference', how-
ever, which was inherently part and parcel 
of the 'presumption of law', continues in the 
case after the presumption of law itself has 
d. d " 1sappeare , ... 
Appellant then argues that the instruction is 
not applicable because if appellant was a bailee at 
all, it was gratuitous bailee and liable for only gross 
negligence, and that gross negligence cannot be in-
ferred. We are given no authority for this proposi-
tion and the general law seems to be to the contrary. 
6 Am. Jur. Bailments, Sec. 364. "'Generally 
no distinction has been made in the cases in 
regard to presumption of negligence or bur-
den of proof, whether the bailment was for 
mutual benefit or for the sole benefit of the 
bailor or of the bailee, the only difference be-
16 
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ing in the degree of care required; and pro-
perly no distinction should be made in these 
classes, the question on whom lies the burden 
to prove care or negligence being apparently 
unaffected by the degree of care or negligence 
which must be proved." 
Appellant's argument is further met by refer-
ence to the facts and theory of defense. First, we see 
the basic agreement between the parties for storage 
of the ~aircraft for the sum of $30.00 per month. 
Second, is appellant's claim for stor1age up to and 
including the time of the fire. Third, destruction of 
the aircraft while in appellant's exclusive possession. 
Fourth, appellant's theory and instruction that it 
owed the aircraft owner the duty of ordinary care. 
These facts and appellant's admission as to its 
duty of ordinary care clearly show a ~compensated 
bailment and bring the ~ase squarely within the 
rule of the Wyatt case, supra. 'The giving of 'an in-
struction relative to the inference of negligence as 
embodied in the court's instruction No. 6 was, there-
fore, proper. 
17 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent proved a bailment and loss of the 
bailed property. It was then incumbent upon appel-
lant to offer evidence that it wrus free from negli-
gence. No such evidence was produced by appellant 
and respondent was, therefore, entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. The jury verdict reaching the 
same result is, therefore, valid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
18 
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